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Abstract. Recently Mode 4 operation of Cellular Vehicle to Everything (C-
V2X) specifies the operation of vehicle-to-vehicle, vehicle-to-pedestrian and 
vehicle-to-UE-stationary over the PC5 interface. However, the security is 
delegated to the application layer, which is out of the scope of the 3GPP-layer 
specification. Hence, we propose a transparent and independent distributed 
security protocol for C-V2X over the PC5 interface at the RLC-layer based on 
cryptographic ratchets. Our new proposed security protocol provides 
authenticated encryption, integrity, forward and backward secrecy. The security 
procedure can start on the fly as soon as vehicles enter a C-V2X group over the 
PC5 interface, using the cryptographic credentials of the digital certificate 
issued for ITS applications. The distributed security protocol supports strong 
encryption, authentication and privacy regardless of the use case in 5G 
applications for C-V2X over the PC5 interface. 
1   Introduction 
Major focus of incoming 5G cellular networks is to secure it from the ground up, 
protecting the confidentiality and integrity of data and control frames with strong 
encryption, as well as the authentication of users. However, 5G security protocols are 
not applicable to PC5 interface, termed Mode 4, as the 5G security mechanisms are 
embedded in the network, leaving security of C-V2X over PC5 out of the scope of the 
3GPP-layer [1]. Of course, security may be applied at the application layer. Initially, 
3GPP specified Release 12 mainly regarding the Proximity Services (ProSe) for 
Device-to-Device (D2D) including unicast, multicast and broadcast. Later, the support 
for Vehicle-to-everything (V2X) over the sidelink PC5 interface was introduced by 
Release 14 and 15 [2][3] which was in fact the legacy from early ITS wireless 
standards. However, IEEE WAVE [4] and ITS- 5G [5] prioritized emergency and 
safety communication (vehicle’s position, speed, vehicle’s technical data, user 
identification, etc.), where latency was a concern for safety. Thus, early ITS 
applications do not include association, handshake, etc., which essentially means all 
vehicles that want to transmit broadcast, while the rest listen under certain scheduling 
for channel access. The security coordination was delegated to layers above the MAC 
layer. To provide multicast and unicast among other services, 3GPP is currently in 
development for Release 16, C-V2X for 5G. 
This  new  V2X  systems  in  5G  can  bring  new  threats,  which   
necessitates   to   revisit   the security assessment for such applications in 5G. 
Conventionally, the secure communication is modeled to achieve confidentiality in 
unicast or multicast sessions, while assuming the communication interfaces are ideal, 
from the physical layer to the application layer. Moreover, it is thought that an 
adversary only observes and interacts with the communication channel. However, 
from the recent security breaches, it is clear that the system vulnerabilities due to 
malware or implementation bugs in hardware and software are critical and an 
immediate threat. For instance, an adversary does not need to break a cryptographic 
key or cipher, but simply extracts it using a system exploit. 
Several solutions have already been proposed to mitigate this vulnerability, most 
notably the family of protocols named Off the Record (OTR) [6]. The concept is to 
mitigate the damage of a compromised key by regularly refreshing keys, while 
making computationally hard to derive future or past keys from a compromised key. 
These OTR based protocols for end-to-end encryption attempt to increase users’ 
privacy as the encrypted traffic is not controlled by intermediary service providers. 
The author in [7] introduced the idea of using a one-way function in the process of 
updating a message key with the aim of establishing forward and backward secrecy, 
later named ratchet. However, the assumption that ciphers like AES and Elliptic-
Curve (EC) cryptography are robust, and as such if there is a security breach via a 
system exploit, that would be more likely in the key management. 
In this proposed work, we employ Radio Link Control (RLC) layer based security 
solution without interacting with the service provider. Thus it can run security 
procedure on the fly as soon as one wants to communicate other. Moreover, unlike 
others, key refreshing is controlled only by the initiator, thus simplifies RLC 
procedure and reduces the key refreshment latency. Hence, we propose a distributed 
security protocol for C-V2X over the PC5 interface at the RLC layer based on 
cryptographic ratchets, which is transparent and independent to the application layer. 
The security protocol introduces cryptographic ratchets and an ephemeral version of 
the Diffie-Hellman (DH) algorithm where keys are created without central control, 
securely protecting the out-of-coverage use case. The security procedure will start on 
the fly as soon as vehicles enter a C-V2X group over the PC5 interface, using the 
cryptographic credentials of the digital certificate issued for ITS applications. The 
proposed distributed security protocol supports strong encryption, authentication, 
integrity and privacy regardless of the use cases in 5G applications for C-V2X over 
the PC5interface. 
2  Background 
The proposed security protocol introduces the use of cryptographic ratchets to secure   
the   PC5   interface of C-V2X sessions and an ephemeral version of the Diffie- 
Hellman (DH) algorithm for the initial cryptographic handshake, protecting the out-
of-coverage use case. Keys are created without central control and a simplified 
cryptographic ratchet algorithm streamline implementation allowing fast data 
transmission. While the proposal runs at the RLC layer, in conjunction with the 
randomization of MAC addresses [1] it supports strong privacy of user identities and 
sensitive vehicle’s data information without the need to use pseudonyms. Moreover, 
our security protocol encrypts RLC-PDUs that include Basic Safety Message (BSM) 
or similar ITS messages, vehicle’s user/owner identity, group identity, IP address, etc. 
The combination of randomization of MAC addresses, the proposed security protocol 
enables strong privacy as well. This protocol also gears toward C-V2X Release 16 
over the PC5 interface regardless of the use case. This can include use cases such as 
V2UAV. To the authors’ knowledge, there is no security protocol that addresses such 
case in C-V2X applications. 
2.1 Protocol Stack for Connected Vehicles 
C-V2X specifies Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V), Vehicle-to-Infrastructure (V2I) and 
Vehicle-to-Pedestrian (V2P) communication via the PC5 interface assuming out-of-
coverage scenarios. The operation of such ad-hoc networks without access to the 5G 
cellular network is supported with two protocol stacks: 1) in the user data plane (UPL) 
and 2) in the user control plane (CPL) [8]. The communication protocol stack 
specified for the CPL differs from UPL in the radio resource control (RRC) layer. 
Cellular V2X (C-V2X) communications are supported with two logical channels:1) 
the Sidelink Broadcast Control Channel (SBCCH) to carry Control Plane (CPL) 
messages, and 2) the Sidelink Traffic Channel (STCH) to carry User Plane (UPL) data 
[8]. Sidelink Control Information (SCI) is used to transmit control information for 
processing time and frequency. In out-of-coverage scenarios of a 5G network, PC-5 
interface C-V3X will come into play. However, 3GPP did not lay out any security 
specification for this interface. We are proposing a distributed security procedure to 
secure the data flow at the RLC layer in order to produce secure RLC Protocol Data 






Fig. 1. Secure RLC PDUs. 
In order for this to work, the MAC Header, the SCI as well as the SL-DCH 
transport blocks need to be transmitted in the clear. After MAC packet filtering, the 
authenticated decryption and integrity check of secure RLC-PDUs can take place. As 
shown in Figure 1.a, the Packet Number (PN) is used for protection against replay 
packets and the Message Integrity Code (MIC) is part of the authenticated encryption 
for integrity and authentication protection of secure RLC-PDUs. 
2.2Protection from Compromised Keys 
A cryptographic ratchet is a procedure of updating an encryption key combined with a 
one-way function, resulting in past and future keys are computationally hard to be 
derived from a compromised key. The proposed security protocol is based on the 
conjectured one-way functions: cryptographic hash function and discrete logarithm 
problem as in the Diffie-Hellman key exchange [9]. Especially, we use the Elliptic 
Curve DH (ECDH) algorithm [10] and the cryptographic hash embedded in the Hash-
based Key Derivation Function (HKDF) [11] to update encryption keys. 
Initially, parties will establish a shared secret key, which is then used as the 
initialization of the cryptographic ratchet algorithm. An ephemeral version of the 
ECDH algorithm will be employed to derive such shared secret key or root key that 
will cover out-of-coverage use cases (Mode 4 of the PC5 interface). Thus, some added 
mechanisms for authentication are required in order to ensure that the cryptographic 
credentials are from the intended party. The mechanisms are based on deniable 
authentication protocol based on Diffie–Hellman algorithm [13][7]. The procedure is 
performed by the concatenation of the ECDH operations applied to the public key of 
vehicle’s digital certificate, an ephemeral key generated per session, and assigned key 
for additional authentication. We assume the vehicle’s digital certificate, which 
includes vehicle’s public key, has been validated by the corresponding Certificate 
Authority (CA) repository. These multiple assurances prevent attacks, like man-in 
the-middle (MitM) attacks, even if the vehicle is out-of-coverage. 
2.3 Security Keys and Functions 
Our proposed security procedure works with several security keys and functions. 
General form of asymmetric key pairs is(𝑑 , 𝐾); where 𝑑  represent the private and 
𝐾 represents the public key. Each vehicle has Identity key pairs (𝑑 , 𝐼𝐾)where 𝐼𝐾 
is the public key in the vehicle’s digital certificate, Vehicles also have ephemeral key 
pair (𝑑 , 𝐸𝐾) which is generated only once per invocation and disposable 
afterwards. In addition, each vehicle has signed key pair (𝑑 , 𝑆𝐾), where 𝑆𝐾 is 
transformed to octets and digitally signed by 𝑑  using EdDSA [12] and represented 
as 𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑆𝐾. In order for this procedure to work, every vehicle has to post the public 
keys and digital signature to the corresponding ITS-PKI repository, as well as the 
refreshed versions when available. Moreover, each vehicle has to store previous keys 
in a secure location locally, in case of delayed packets. Further, every vehicle has to 
delete securely every disposable key pair and signature locally and in the 
corresponding repository. A set of keys we called it the bundle-keys of a given 
vehicle as the set of public keys and signature {𝐼𝐾, 𝑆𝐾, 𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑆𝐾 } need to be posted to 
the corresponding repository for online validation. 
Besides key pairs, we also have employed several functions to run the security 
procedure.  
 𝐷𝑆. 𝑇𝑒𝑠𝑡(𝑃𝐾, 𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒): performs a verification of Signature using public 
𝑃𝐾; 
 𝐷𝐻. 𝑃𝐾(𝑑 , 𝑃𝐾 ): obtains the shared secret key from the ECDH algorithm with 
the private key 𝑑  and public key 𝑃𝐾 .  
 𝑅𝑆𝐶(): obtains the value of a receiver sequence counter used to protect against 
replay packets. 
 𝐻𝐾𝐷𝐹(): obtains the message key from the Hash-based Key Derivation Function 
defined as [11], 𝑀𝐾 = 𝐻𝐾𝐷𝐹(𝑍, 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑡, 𝐻𝑎𝑠ℎ, 𝐿, 𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜) . Here 𝑀𝐾 is the 
message key for encryption and decryption; 𝑍 is the shared secret as an octet 
sequence generated during the execution of a key-establishment scheme of either 
the EDH algorithm (during the cryptographic hand-shake) or the conventional 
ECDH algorithm (during the cryptographic ratchet); 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑡 is a message 
authentication code (MAC) used as key for the randomness-extraction step 
during two-step key derivation; 𝐻𝑎𝑠ℎ indicates the Hash function employed 
(SHA-2 or SHA-3) in the HMAC procedure for randomness-extraction and key-
expansion; 𝐿 is the length of 𝑀𝐾 in bits, and 𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜 is an octet sequence 
of context-specific data, whose value does not change during the execution of the 
HKDF. 
Finally, we quickly summarize the ECDH parameters in order to introduce the 
notation of variables used across the paper. Given the domain parameters for EC 
Cryptography(𝑝, 𝑎, 𝑏, 𝐺, 𝑛, ℎ), there exist a curve over a finite field 𝐹  and base point 
𝐺 such that given 𝑑 as a random number in [1, 2, . . . 𝑛 1] such that 𝑄 =  𝑑𝐺. The 
generated key pair (𝑑, 𝑄) defines the public key as 𝑄 and the private key as 𝑑. 
3 Proposed Scheme 
3.1 Cryptographic Handshake and Initial Shared Key 
The   Extended   Diffie-Hellman    (EDH)    algorithm [7][13][14] is used for 
the key agreement protocol based on a shared secret key between the parties. This 
allows authenticated encryption (AE) and integrity check during the cryptographic 
handshake, besides of cryptographic deniability at the RLC layer. This step will create 
a initial shared key that will be used as a root key in the later security procedure. The 
EDH procedure is depicted below by Algorithm 1. To follow the procedure let Peer 𝑘 
and Peer 𝑙 are two parties need to exchange encrypted information. In case of offline 
or out-of-coverage situation, one party Peer 𝑘  can start a secure session by 
requesting Peer’s 𝑙 public keys either directly via a command frame, or to a CA 
repository. As mentioned before the public key in the digital certificate is defined as 
the Identity Key (𝐼𝐾). The corresponding private key is located in a secure location 
in every Peer device. 
Now, Peer 𝑘starts a secure communication session with Peer 𝑙  over PC5 by 
requesting the bundle-keys of Peer 𝑙 via the command frame Get.Key.Request(), and 
validates such bundle-keys with the corresponding CA repository. If Peer 𝑘 is offline 
the 5G network, such validation is postponed till Peer 𝑘 is back online. However, the 
cryptographic handshake can continue in the mean time. In order to get the bundle-
keys of Peer 𝑘, Peer 𝑙 can follow similar procedure. Peer 𝑘 will only proceeds with 
the EDH algorithm once a full validation of the cryptographic credentials is passed. 
The EDH handshake consists of two parts: 1) Derives 𝑆𝑆𝐾 in Peer  𝑘, 2) Derives 
𝑆𝑆𝐾 in Peer 𝑙. Once both 𝑆𝑆𝐾 matched, the derived 𝑆𝑆𝐾 is then used as the Root 
Key (𝑅𝐾) for the cryptographic ratchet algorithm in order to provide forward and 
backward secrecy. The EDH procedure 1 is executed by Peer 𝑘, while the EDH 
procedure 2 is executed by Peer 𝑙. 
Algorithm 1  Extended Diffie-Hellman 
Procedure EDH.1 
Input: Key of Peer 𝑘 
Output: Shared Secret Key (𝑆𝑆𝐾) 
Steps: 
 Bundle-keys of Peer 𝑙: 𝐺𝑒𝑡. 𝐾𝑒𝑦(𝑃𝑒𝑒𝑟 𝑙); 
 Signature Check: 
 𝐷𝑆. 𝑇𝑒𝑠𝑡(𝐼𝐾 , 𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 ); 
 Return Status: FAIL and 𝑆𝑆𝐾: 0, if fails. 
 Generate (𝑑 , 𝐸𝐾  ) ; 
 𝐷𝐻  =   𝐷𝐻. 𝑃𝐾(𝑑  , 𝑆𝐾 , ); 
 𝐷𝐻  =   𝐷𝐻. 𝑃𝐾(𝑑  , 𝐼𝐾 , ); 
 𝐷𝐻  =   𝐷𝐻. 𝑃𝐾(𝑑  , 𝑆𝐾 , ); 
 𝐷 =  𝐷𝐻 ||𝐷𝐻 ||𝐷𝐻 ; 
 𝑆𝑆𝐾 =
 𝐻𝐾𝐷𝐹(𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑡, 𝐷, 𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜 , 𝐻𝑎𝑠ℎ256); 
 Encrypt with 𝑆𝑆𝐾 a known message 
 Concatenate 𝐼𝐾, 𝑆𝐾, 𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑆𝐾 𝐸𝐾𝑘 
 Send over to Peer l for response. 
Procedure EDH.2 
Input: Keys of Peer l; Payload of the received 
from Peer k. 
Output : Shared Secret Key (SSK) 
Steps: 
 Peer 𝑙receives a request to send its 
bundle-keys to Peer 𝑘; 
 Peer 𝑙 sends its keys to Peer 𝑘; 
 Peer 𝑙 receives from Peer 𝑘 its keys 
and 𝐸𝐾 ; 
 Signature Check: 
 𝐷𝑆. 𝑇𝑒𝑠𝑡(𝐼𝐾 , 𝑆𝑖𝑔𝑛𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑟𝑒 ); 
 Return Status: FAIL and 𝑆𝑆𝐾: 0, if fails. 
 𝐷𝐻  =   𝐷𝐻. 𝑃𝐾(𝑑  , 𝐼𝐾 , ); 
 𝐷𝐻  =   𝐷𝐻. 𝑃𝐾(𝑑  , 𝐸𝐾 , ); 
 𝐷𝐻  =   𝐷𝐻. 𝑃𝐾(𝑑  , 𝐸𝐾 , ); 
 𝐷 =  𝐷𝐻 ||𝐷𝐻 ||𝐷𝐻 ; 
 𝑆𝑆𝐾 =
 𝐻𝐾𝐷𝐹(𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑡, 𝐷, 𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜 , 𝐻𝑎𝑠ℎ256); 
 Decrypt the sent message with𝑆𝑆𝐾 to see 
whether it have the know message. 
 If fail 𝑆𝑆𝐾 = 0 
 
 
After a successful EDH procedure, vehicles will share a secret key (𝑆𝑆𝐾), which 
can be used to initialize the cryptographic ratchet algorithm. Moreover, after the 𝑆𝑆𝐾 
successfully generated, pair will exchange DH completion message to end the 
procedure as shown in figure 1.b.The shared secret key before the HKDF is formed as 
𝐷 = 𝑑 𝑑 𝐺||𝑑 𝑑 𝐺 ||𝑑 𝑑 𝐺 to avoid MitM attacks. 
3.2 Message Key Creation and Management 
After successful completion of EDH procedure, the cryptographic handshake is 
complete and the resulting shared secret key (𝑆𝑆𝐾) becomes the root key (𝑅𝐾) in the 
cryptographic ratchet algorithm. Thus initialize with 𝑅𝐾: 1) HKDF ratchet will 
provide a symmetric key for a block or stream cipher (backward secrecy), 2) a 
conventional ECDH algorithm as DH ratchet to provide a shared secret key used as 
HMAC key to the HKDF (forward secrecy), 3) exchanging public keys for the DH 
ratchet via RLC-PDUs over a secure channel. Fib 1b illustrates this exchange with the 
commands Send.DH.Request() and Send.DH.Response(). 
Our proposed security procedure supports backward secrecy utilizing HKDF 
ratchet. Let’s assume the initiator, Peer k, controls the refreshing of cryptographic 
ratchet keys. Thus HKDF ratchet is implemented as an iterative one-way function 
given by 𝑀𝐾 =  𝐻𝐾𝐷𝐹(𝑀𝐾 , 𝑆𝐾 , 𝐻𝑎𝑠ℎ, 𝐿, 𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜)  where 𝑛 =
 0, 1. . . , 𝑀𝐾 is the message key for encryption and  decryption  at  stage  
𝑛, 𝑀𝐾   =  𝑅𝐾 is  the  root key from  the  EDH  algorithm;  𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑡 =  𝑆𝐾𝐾 is 
the shared secret key from the DH ratchet generated by the 𝑘th user; 𝐻𝑎𝑠ℎ is 
generated by SHA-3 [15]; 𝐿 is the length of the message key in bits; 𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜 =
𝐼𝐾𝑘||𝐼𝐾𝑙||𝑃𝑁  is given  by where 𝑃𝑁  (Packet Number) is an unsigned integer 
rollover counter initialized to 0 at the start of a secure communication session, and 
incremented by 1 per transmitted RLC-PDU, which is used for protection against 
replay frames. Notice  that  the  same  message  key,  𝑀𝐾 is  derived in both 
Peer 𝑘 and Peer 𝑙 at stage n for encryption and decryption respectively. 
While HKDF ratchet provides backward secrecy, the DH ratchet supports forward 
secrecy: if a given message key is compromised, future keys cannot be derived as the 
DH ratchet resets the HKDF ratchet. The exchange of public keys and management 
information is performed over a secured channel with integrity and authentication 
checks. The main motivation for cryptographic ratchets is to mitigate the damage of a 
compromised key by regularly refreshing keys, while making computationally hard to 
derive future or past keys from a compromised key based on one-way functions. In 
order to increase users’ privacy by end-to-end encryption while the encrypted traffic is 
not controlled by intermediary service providers, several protocols have been 
proposed. For instance, the protocol in [7] introduced the concept of double ratchet, 
handles 3 chains: root, sending and receiving chain, in which a message key is 
refreshed by swapping the sending and receiving chains between two end-to-end 
participants. These participants take turns to refresh the ratchet keys, like a table 
tennis game. Our proposal in contrast uses a generalized iterative HKDF and ECDH 
as cryptographic ratchets without the need to define such chains (root, sending, 
receiving) and without the need that participants take turns to refresh the ratchet keys 
as the algorithm goes on. As such, the initiator controls the refreshing of keys during a 
communication session, simplifying the protocol implementation. 
Algorithm 2 illustrates the proposed cryptographic ratchet protocol for C-V2X over 
the PC5 interface performed by Peer 𝑘, and by Peer 𝑙. The DH ratchet however, 
requires the exchange of public keys between Peers. The commands 
Get.Keys.Request() and Get.Keys.Response() are used for this purpose over a secure 
channel as shown in Fig 1b. These public keys can be inserted in RLC-PDUs. After 
the public keys of the DH ratchet are exchanged, the derived 𝑆𝐾  at stage 𝑛 + 1 
is used as the 𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑡 input of the iterative HKDF ratchet, and consequently a new 
message key is computed in Peer 𝑘 for encryption and Peer 𝑙 for decryption. 
Algorithm 2  Cryptographic Ratchet  
Procedure Double Ratchet.1 
Input: Root key from the EDH handshake; 
Domain parameters of EC; Parameters of  HKDF 
(𝑅𝐾) 
Output : Message key for Peer 𝑘(𝑀𝐾 ); 
Steps: 
 Initialize state for Peer 𝑘;  
 Generate (𝑑 𝑄 ); 
 Send 𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑑. 𝐷𝐻. 𝑅𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑠𝑡() to Peer 𝑙  with 
𝑄  over a secure channel and waits for a 
response; 
 Peer 𝑘  receives the command 
𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑑. 𝐷𝐻. 𝑅𝑒𝑠𝑝𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑒()  with 𝑄  from 
Peer 𝑙 over a secure channel; 
 𝑆𝐾 =  𝐷𝐻. 𝑃𝐾(𝑑 , 𝑄 ); 
 𝑀𝐾 =
 𝐻𝐾𝐷𝐹(𝑀𝐾 , 𝑆𝐾 , 𝐻𝑎𝑠ℎ, 𝐿, 𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜); 
 Peer 𝑘  Encrypts RLC-PDU with 𝑀𝐾  
key at stage 𝑛 + 1 
 
Procedure Double Ratchet.2 
Input: Root key from the EDH handshake; Domain 
parameters of EC; Parameters of  HKDF (𝑅𝐾) 
Payload of command 𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑑. 𝐷𝐻. 𝑅𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑠𝑡(); 
Output : Message key for Peer 𝑙(𝑀𝐾); 
Steps: 
 Initialize state for Peer 𝑘: 
 Peer l receives the command 
𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑑. 𝐷𝐻. 𝑅𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑠𝑡() with 𝑄  from Peer 
𝑘; 
 Peer l receives the command 
𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑑. 𝐷𝐻. 𝑅𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑠𝑡() with 𝑄  from Peer 
𝑘; 
 Generate (𝑑 , 𝑄 ); 
 Send 𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑑. 𝐷𝐻. 𝑅𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑠𝑡()  to Peer 𝑘 with 
𝑄 over asecure channel and waits for a 
response; 
 𝑆𝐾 =  𝐷𝐻. 𝑃𝐾(𝑑 , 𝑄 ); 
 𝑀𝐾 =
 𝐻𝐾𝐷𝐹 𝑀𝐾 , 𝑆𝐾 , 𝐻𝑎𝑠ℎ, 𝐿, 𝑂𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝐼𝑛𝑓𝑜 ; 
 Peer 𝑙  Encrypts (or Decrypts) RLC-PDU 
with 𝑀𝐾  key at stage 𝑛 + 1 
 
The refreshing of ratchet keys may be preset by vendors or indicated by 
applications. Note that if the CA bans a vehicle’s certificate, the proposed security 
protocol cannot proceed. Then vehicle has to go through re-registration to the CA 
with appropriate penalty to resolve the dispute.  
 
3.6 Security Analysis  
Here we present a formal analysis of the proposed security protocol.  
One may try to use software or system exploit to extract security keys. However, it 
cannot acquire such keys since security procedure is controlled by RLC layer. If one 
tries to put any discrepancy in RLC layer, the procedure will not commence.  
All the device keys will be stored in tamper resistant module of the device. If one 
tries to break it in order to obtain the keys, the device will automatically send message 
to the CA and the device keys will be registered as banned key. Thus a compromised 
device will lose its certificate from CA. 
An attacker can use a compromised device B (Peer k) to acquire the private 
messages from device A (Peer l). However, the security procedure with device A will 
first check the identity key 𝐼𝐾  of device B in its digital certificate and CA 
repository, and will find that it is banned. Thus, such compromised device B will not 
able to complete the handshake procedure and hence not procure private messages.  
An attacker can try Man in the Middle (MitM) attack. A rogue device R may 
download all the keys (public) of device B and send those to device A in order to 
commence the security handshake. While device A generates the 𝑆𝑆𝐾as indicated in 
Algorithm 1, and sends an encrypted message in 𝑆𝑒𝑛𝑑. 𝐷𝐻. 𝑅𝑒𝑞𝑢𝑒𝑠𝑡(), device R 
cannot recreate the 𝑆𝑆𝐾 counterpart without having device B’s private keys. Thus 





An attacker may retrieve session key from communicating message. However, it 
can only obtain the current message, the previous message keys cannot be derived, 
because of the HKDF ratchet. As such, previous encrypted messages are secured. 
4. Conclusion 
We propose a distributed security protocol for C-V2X over the PC5 interface at the   
RLC-layer based on cryptographic ratchets, which provides authenticated encryption, 
integrity, privacy, forward and backward secrecy. The proposal can be introduced on 
the fly as soon as vehicles enter a C-V2X group over the PC5 interface, regardless of 
the use case in 5G applications for C-V2X. All Elliptic-Curve (EC) keys are created 
without central control and a simplified cryptographic ratchet algorithm simplifies 
implementation allowing fast data   transmission. 
As the security protocol runs at the RLC layer, the proposal in combination with the 
randomization of MAC addresses [1] supports strong privacy of user identities and 
sensitive vehicle’s data information without the need to use pseudonyms. The 
proposed security protocol supports a strong level of protection due to the 
authentication, integrity, confidentiality, privacy and protection against replay of 
packets at the RLC layer of C-V2X applications over the PC5 interface. Furthermore, 
if an attacker compromises an encryption key, such attack would not be able to derive 
previous or future keys as the algorithm goes on, because of the forward and 
backward secrecy properties. 
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